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Review
New thinking, innateness and inherited
representation
Nicholas Shea*
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, 10 Merton Street, Oxford OX1 4JJ, UK
The New Thinking contained in this volume rejects an Evolutionary Psychology that is committed
to innate domain-specific psychological mechanisms: gene-based adaptations that are unlearnt,
developmentally fixed and culturally universal. But the New Thinking does not simply deny the
importance of innate psychological traits. The problem runs deeper: the concept of innateness is
not suited to distinguishing between the New Thinking and Evolutionary Psychology. That
points to a more serious problem with the concept of innateness as it is applied to human psycho-
logical phenotypes. This paper argues that the features of recent human evolution highlighted by
the New Thinking imply that the concept of inherited representation, set out here, is a better tool
for theorizing about human cognitive evolution.
Keywords: evolutionary psychology; innateness; inherited representation; genetic information;
cognitive evolution; cultural inheritance
1 INTRODUCTION
(a) NewThinking versusEvolutionaryPsychology
It is standardly assumed that innate psychological mech-
anisms should be the central focus of an evolutionary
account of human cognition. One version of this
approach is the ‘Evolutionary Psychology’ (capitalized)
of Tooby and Cosmides with its series of special-purpose
modules, each evolved to solve a particular problem in
the Pleistocene [1]. Even outside high church Evolution-
ary Psychology, for example among those who point to
more general-purpose evolved human faculties like the
capacity for fine-grained visuomotor control, an evol-
utionary approach to human cognition is usually allied
with a commitment to innate capacities.
A strong theme emerging from the papers in this
volume puts pressure on the idea that there are
innate psychological capacities at all. These are not
blank slate empiricists or cultural determinists who
deny the importance of evolution for explaining why
we are as we are. If the New Thinking is on the right
track, however, then innateness is not a useful concept
for theorizing about recent human cognition.
Many papers in the volume emphasize domain-
general adaptations: improved physical/causal under-
standing, increased visuomotor skill, and an extended
childhood coupled with increased parental investment
[2,3]. At a recent conference on the new thinking, Eva
Jablonka argued that the hand is a much better meta-
phor than the Swiss-army knife for the special features
of recent human cognition [4,5]. The hand is exqui-
sitely complex and highly adapted, involving a suite
of interdependent adaptive changes, but it is not
adapted to any one particular task or outcome. It
appears to have been selected instead for its facility
as a generalist: to perform an open-ended range of
tasks with great skill, where the concrete outcomes
that contribute to fitness vary widely.
Two domain-general changes in hominin evolution
are central here. The first is a marked increase in plas-
ticity: in how quickly human individuals and social
groups adapt to different ways of life in different
ecological niches [6]. These developmentally plastic
innovations depend for their development on rich
support from the environment: information about
particular variable features of the developmental
environment, including resources and information
derived from the ecological niche, from parents and
from the wider culture [7].
The second change is a much greater reliance on
culturally transmitted information. Among the
adaptively-significant information on which develop-
ment depends, some concerns facts that individuals
could not learn for themselves in their own lifetime.
In these circumstances individuals do not test and con-
firm for themselves that the developmental path they
are adopting is adaptive; they rely on the information
in their culture being a reasonably reliable guide to
adaptive outcomes. So human behavioural develop-
ment is extremely plastic, and some of that plasticity
involves sensitivity to culturally transmitted infor-
mation [7,8]. More strongly still, it is plausible that
humans have adaptations for the cultural transmission
of information, including through teaching and learn-
ing [9]. So, if cognition has evolved to be like the hand,
it is a hand that was partly shaped by a culture of other
hands, and which in turn plays a role in shaping other
hands, being itself partly adapted to passing on the
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kind of cultural resources on which it depended on for
its own development.
An evolutionary approach is often coupled with the
thought that adaptive traits are innate. An innate trait is
prototypically1 an adaptation that has evolved by gene-
based natural selection, and is thereby coded in the
genes. Its development does not depend on learning,
and it would develop even if experience were impover-
ished in certain ways. Correlatively, it is relatively
developmentally fixed in the face of environmental
variations, and perhaps canalized against such vari-
ations. Indeed, on some views an innate trait is
genetically determined from birth. And it is universal
in the species, either in the sense that all members
have it apart from non-typical cases in which there is
an explanation of their exceptional status or, if there
is typical variation in how the trait is manifested, then
some shared basis for that variation is universal.
Evolutionary Psychology aims to account for the
distinctive features of human life by appealing to
special-purpose psychological capacities that have
exactly those features: they are prototypically the
result of gene-based natural selection, do not depend
upon learning for their acquisition (and so admit of a
poverty of the stimulus argument), are relatively
developmentally fixed and hence culturally universal.
This is in sharp contrast to the central features of the
NewThinking identified earlier. So it might be thought
that Evolutionary Psychology believes in, whereas the
New Thinking denies, the importance of innate
psychological capacities; and thus that the New Think-
ing makes less appeal to evolutionary considerations
than high church Evolutionary Psychology.
That is a misdiagnosis: the New Thinking is just
as motivated by evolutionary considerations. It relies
heavily on selectionist explanation, phylogenetic
methods and cross-species comparisons. It sees many
domain-specific adaptations in human cognitive and
social life. Some arise from gene-based selection,
others from culturally based inheritance processes.
Some are universal and others vary in different eco-
logical and cultural contexts. Learning is involved in
the acquisition of many of these traits, even when
individuals are not able to learn about the adaptive
significance of the trait for themselves. The New
Thinking does not sit well either with accepting or
denying that the relevant capacities are innate. That
is because the concept of innateness is fundamentally
unsuited to elucidating the contrast between the New
Thinking and Evolutionary Psychology.
This paper will argue that the concept of inherited
representation does a much better job of drawing the dis-
tinction. Evolutionary Psychology is committed to
gene-based selection as the main source of the adap-
tively relevant information that is responsible for
the adaptiveness of human psychological capacities;
hence such capacities are unlearnt. The New Thinking
emphasizes the complementary roles of gene-based
and of culturally-based selection processes of various
kinds for generating the adaptively relevant infor-
mation on which human psychological capacities are
based; hence the importance of interactions with the
physical and social environment, and of learning, in
developing those capacities.
(b) Deeper troubles with innateness
Inutility is bad enough, but the troubles with the innate-
ness concept run deeper. As philosophers, we want to
know what property the concept of innateness refers
to. That is, we want a theoretical reconstruction of the
claim that a trait X is innate—we want to know what
it is about a trait that determineswhether the innateness
claim is true or false. This exercise is not merely of phi-
losophical interest. It is continuous with the scientific
project of trying better to understand the properties
that are appealed to in a scientific theory. To do so,
we can observe the pattern of inferences in which a
theoretical concept such as innateness is deployed, and
seek to understand what the property is that underpins
those inferences: that makes them defeasible but
reasonably reliable ways of reaching true conclusions
from true premises. The deeper problem with the con-
cept of innateness is that there is no good account of
what the property of being innate could be, so as to
underpin the ways that the concept is used in relation
to human psychological capacities.
The concept of innateness is used tomake inferences
between various properties like those mentioned ear-
lier: developmental fixity, lack of learning and genetic
coding—‘i-properties’ (adapting the terminology of
Mameli & Bateson [17]). For instance: X is an adap-
tation! X is innate! X’s development does not
depend upon learning. That inference is highly unreli-
able because, as the New Thinking points out, many
recent human adaptations depend crucially on learn-
ing. The problem is not just that the concept is
sometimes used to make bad inferences. Rather, the
problem is that there is no good proposal about how
the concept could be used to make reliable inferences.
What could the property of being innate amount to,
such that the conclusions about human psychological
capacities drawn using the concept should be reliable?
If there were occasional exceptions, the concept
would still be useful. If there were systematic excep-
tions, they could be guarded against in deploying the
concept. But the concept is much more problematic if
there is no property at all that would make inferences
among the i-properties generally reliable in relation to
human psychological traits.
The New Thinking puts pressure on the possibility
of a satisfying theoretical reconstruction of the concept
of innateness in two ways, one familiar, and the other
less so. Its richly interactive picture of development
undermines the tie, mediated by the innateness con-
cept, between adaptation and developing without
reliance on experience. There has been selection for
a variety of clever behavioural phenotypes, such as
the ability to process foodstuffs, or to make tools, or
to cooperate with others in a hunt. Extended child-
hood and increased parental investment allow the
development of many human phenotypes to be more
richly interactive with the environment for a longer
period. These changes in lifeways are themselves plau-
sibly adaptations [19]. Evolution does not care about
the devious and richly interactive route by which
some clever behavioural phenotype has developed. It
sees the phenotype that is the end point of develop-
ment, and selection acts on that. Plausibly, many are
adaptations. That developmental process happens to
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depend very heavily on learning and culture. When
development is so richly interactive, depending upon
all kinds of material and informational support from
the structured ecological environment, and from
other people, it is just a mistake to link being an adap-
tation with developing relatively independently of
experience.
Furthermore, the emphasis on plasticity severs any
potential link between adaptation and developmental
fixity. Typical human innovations develop in a way
that is open to environmental information, so as to
fit in with variations in the environment. Even if
such outcomes are robust against some forms of
environmental variation, it is misleading to think
of phenotypes whose development depends upon vari-
able features of the environment as being relatively
fixed or canalized against environmental variation. In
short, in recent human evolution at least, there is no
tie between being a phenotypic adaptation and devel-
opment’s unfolding in a certain way (i.e. being fixed
and/or independent of experience).
The interactive nature of development has long
been the basis of critiques of the innateness concept
[20]. Standard counterexamples suggest that even uni-
versal adaptations need not be particularly well-
insulated against environmental variation. For instance
normal skin structure in humans depends on dietary
vitamin C. Nevertheless, it was still argued that, for
gene-based adaptations, development is so organized
that genetic information plays a special role. Granted,
environmental factors give essential causal support to
the development of an adaptive trait, just as they did
when it was selected, but the information that allows
it to be adaptive derives from the genes, not from
the environment. That is the proposal offered by
Konrad Lorenz in response to critiques of the concept
of innateness [21]. His proposed theoretical recon-
struction of the innateness concept is that innate
traits are those whose development depends on genetic
information. That line is challenged by the second
feature of the New Thinking identified earlier: the
fact that much adaptively-significant information is
culturally transmitted.
Although some forms of cultural evolution remain
controversial, there are a variety of ways that broadly
cultural processes accumulate adaptively-relevant
information that is relied on for the development of
adaptive phenotypes [22]. It has been argued that in
humans gene–culture coevolution accelerated this
process through positive feedback [6], both increasing
the number of phenotypes that depend in part on
gene-based adaptation, and magnifying the extent to
which human cognitive development relies on cultu-
rally transmitted information. That undermines the
possibility of even a rough dichotomy between individ-
uals learning for themselves and relying on genetic
information. Reliance on culturally transmitted
adaptively-significant information forms an important
third class: neither genetically transmitted and present
at birth, nor just a matter of individuals learning
for themselves about their environment—since cul-
tural processes allow development to be sensitive to
information beyond that available in the lifetime of
an individual.
The other leading proposal for a theoretical recon-
struction of the concept of innateness is that it just
picks out the property of being unlearnt [14]. That
would make sense of the way the innateness concept
is used in relation to human psychological capacities
if traits that depend on learning tend not to have the
i-properties, i.e. tend not to be species typical, nor
developmentally canalized, nor adaptations. The diffi-
culty for that construal is that no way of making the
concept of learning more precise does the job, as will
be argued later. To preview: if learning is understood
narrowly then many species-variable, developmentally
plastic traits will count as unlearnt, hence innate. On
the other hand, if learning is understood widely to
include all the cases where an individual extracts
information from the environment during develop-
ment of a psychological trait, then many universal
developmentally canalized traits, both adaptations
and non-adaptations, will count as learnt, hence not
innate. Neither way of delimiting what is to count as
a learning process will make inferences among the
i-properties generally reliable in respect of human
psychological capacities.
In short, even if the concept of innateness works well
enough in other biological domains, it is problematic
with respect to the phenotypic traits that have arisen
in recent hominin evolution. Nevertheless, the New
Thinking is a thoroughly evolutionary approach.
What replaces claims about innateness? This paper
argues that the innateness concept should be replaced
by the concept of genetic representation, and its gener-
alization to epigenetic and cultural inheritance systems:
inherited representation. Inherited representation is
not a direct substitute for innateness, but allows us to
articulate the way in which selection and adaptation
are central to the New Thinking. It is suited to explain-
ing aspects of phenotypic development that the
abandonment of the concept of innateness would
leave unexplained. Section 3 makes that case, and §2
lays the foundations by setting out an account of the
semantic information carried by inheritance systems
as it applies in other biological domains.
2 GENETIC REPRESENTATION
(a) Information generated by natural selection
on genes
The first step is to see how genetic representation
explains what is going on with innateness claims in
other cases, outside human cognition. Then §3
argues that the concept goes particularly badly awry
when applied to the results of recent human evolution.
The concept of innateness is applied on the basis
of, and used to make inferences to, the various
i-properties mentioned earlier. We have seen that the
robustness of the connection between these properties
and being a genetically-based adaptation has been
seriously questioned. Nevertheless, evolution produces
exquisitely adaptive phenotypes, and one feature of
how they develop would be entirely mysterious but
for the theory of natural selection.
Consider the close match between the bills of the
purple-throated carib hummingbird Eulampis jugularis
and the shape of the flowers on which they feed. Males
2236 N. Shea Review. New thinking and innateness
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2012)
 on June 25, 2012rstb.royalsocietypublishing.orgDownloaded from 
develop bills that match the short straight flowers of
Heliconia caribeae, and the smaller females develop
longer curved bills that fit perfectly into the long
curved flowers of Heliconia bihai [23]. The humming-
bird somehow manages to develop a bill that will
perfectly match a particular species of flower, but not
as a result of causally interacting with the flower
during development. The shape of the bill carries
information about the shape of the flowers on which
they feed. That information does not derive from
interacting with the flower shape during development.
So where did it come from? How does the developing
hummingbird ‘know’ what shape of bill to produce, to
match available nectar sources in its local ecology?
There is evidence that the bills and flowers have coe-
volved, so the same question can be asked about the
development of Heliconia flowers [24].
The same question is just as pressing for behavioural
traits such as those we are considering here. How does
the animal know how to behave without learning [25]?
More carefully, how does the developing individual
acquire a disposition for species-typical adaptive behav-
iour when the information that enables the behaviour to
match the environment has not been derived from the
environment during development? Of course we know
that natural selection explains how adaptations arise,
but it is less remarked that it also provides an answer
to this informational question about development.
The developing individual does not need informa-
tion because there has been natural selection for a
developmental process that arrives at the appropriate
phenotype reasonably reliably. At some point a genetic
variant or variants arose that biased development in the
direction of a particular phenotype, which affected
fitness and was selected. Neither at the stage of selec-
tion, nor subsequently, did development need to pick
up on information about the environment. How, then,
did the informational connection between adaptive
phenotype and environmental feature arise? By virtue
of selection—increasing the frequency of the variant
which adaptively matched the environment. The devel-
opmental outcome of hummingbird bill development
now carries information about flower shape by virtue
of a history of selection in a population, increasing the
frequency of matching variants.
(b) Genes carry semantic information
This account of how genetic information plays a
role in individual development can be made more
precise using the philosophical concept of genetic repre-
sentation. We can distinguish between the kind of
information studied by information theory, based on
correlations between one thing and another, and
semantic information, in which a sign or representation
supports a distinction between correctness and incor-
rectness, or being satisfied versus not. Correlational
information is absolutely ubiquitous. Semantic infor-
mation is much rarer in nature, but very familiar in
ordinary life. It is the kind of content carried by
sentences and thoughts.
Heritability at the time of selection means that at
the time of selection genetic variants carry correla-
tional information about phenotypic variants. And
very many factors that make a causal impact on devel-
opment, including the genome, carry correlational
information about phenotypic outcomes—had the
factor been different, the outcome would have been
different. Most of these factors just carry correlational,
not semantic information. The claim that there is gen-
etic representation is the claim that genetic material
also carries information of the stronger, semantic var-
iety. Roughly the idea is that genes do not just happen
to carry correlational information, but they are sup-
posed to—in the unobjectionable naturalistic sense of
‘supposed to’ underpinned by evolutionary functions
and natural selection.2
The case for genetic representation is founded on
the fact that DNA does not just happen to be a
means of transmitting phenotypes down the gener-
ations. There is good evidence that it has undergone
selection for the way it performs that function
[26,27]. That is to say, in addition to the evolutionary
functions acquired by individual genes, the whole
apparatus of DNA coding, translation, transcription
and replication has the meta-level function of transmit-
ting phenotypes down the generations. When a new
genetic variant arises that correlates with a phenotypic
difference, natural selection can act. Those correlations
can be very long range, with the phenotypic variants
being the result of a long and interactive process of
development. Still, the result is that the selected genetic
variant and its associated phenotypic variant increase in
frequency, hence carry correlational information about
the circumstances of selection. The DNA system is
designed to transmit that phenotype to future gener-
ations (by transmitting the genetic variant with which
it correlates). Now consider the zygotic DNA in an
individual in a subsequent generation. For the system
of DNA expression to perform its meta-function it
should react to the selected gene by producing, by
the same long interactive process of development, the
phenotype for which it was selected.
Those facts mean that the genetic system falls within
a simple model for characterizing the contents carried
by low-level representing systems [28–30]. The
elements are a ‘consumer’ system with the evolutionary
function of responding to a variety of different rep-
resentations by producing a variety of different
outcomes, and some method by which representations
are produced by which they correlate with external fac-
tors in such a way that the outputs of the consumer
system are able to perform their evolutionary functions.
A simple example is the honeybee nectar dance. ‘Con-
sumer’ bees respond to the dance of an incoming
worker by flying off a certain distance and direction
in relation to the sun. That behaviour performs its evol-
utionary function on condition that there is nectar at
that distance and in that direction. The behaviour of
the consumer bees manages to fulfil that evolutionary
function because incoming worker bees produce
dances that correlate in a corresponding way with the
location of nectar. The correlation produced by the
incoming workers is an ‘exploitable relation’ [30],
which outgoing consumer bees make use of, in the
sense that the correlation is a reasonably reliable indi-
cator that a condition on the behaviour they will
perform being useful is in place.
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In the genetic case the genes in the zygote are the
representations and the whole long extended interac-
tive processes of development are the consumer,
eventuating in the phenotypic features exhibited by
the organism. (DNA is also active within individual
cells during development, but for present purposes
that is a distraction, because it is not part of the
reason why zygotic DNA has the representational
content it does.) Because DNA has the exotic meta-
function mentioned earlier, its job is to react to indi-
vidual genes by producing, possibly at the end of a
long and complex developmental process, the pheno-
types for which they were selected. Development
makes use of the correlation between genes and the
environments in which they were selected as being a
reasonably reliable indicator that the current environ-
ment is conducive to the phenotypes that result.
If the environment has changed in relevant ways
since the time of selection, that condition will no
longer be in place, so the content carried by the gen-
etic representation will be false. For example, if the
selected phenotype depended upon the environment
being warm, and it has since become cold, then the con-
dition that the selected gene is representing—a warm
environment—is absent. The genetic material then
continues to represent (falsely) that the environment
is warm and DNA expression and development, in
accordance with its meta-function, faithfully produces
a warm-appropriate phenotype as result. That pheno-
type is no longer good for the organism. This failure
is explained by the fact that the content represented
by the zygotic DNA is now false.
This account of genetic representation has been
developed in detail elsewhere [31–34]. It is not
simply a philosophers’ gloss on well-known facts
about natural selection. It has various explanatory
benefits, for example when natural selection makes
choices between relying on genetic or environmental
information about some fitness-relevant factor
[35,36]. For our purposes the key payoff is that it
offers an explanation of the question we started with:
how the developmental process in an individual man-
ages to achieve an adaptive match to its environment
without deriving from the developmental environment
all the adaptively-relevant information that is actually
carried by the adaptive phenotype. For example, an
individual E. jugularis female ends up with a bill that
so carefully matches the shape of the H. bihai flowers
that it will feed from because the zygote contains gen-
etic material that instructs the development of a long
curved bill, and indicates that the environment is
likely to contain flowers conducive to that shaped
bill. That is why the individual does not need to
interact with the shape of the flowers, or derive infor-
mation about their shape in any other way from its
own experience.
If DNA were the only inheritance system, then a
developing individual would have access to only two
sources of adaptively-significant information: genetic
material, and the correlations that it could detect in
the course of its own development. In fact the sources
are much wider. Transgenerational epigenetic effects
allow an individual to make use of information
detected by its parents in their lifetime [37], as do
parental effects mediated by other means. Some epige-
netic effects may be transmitted with high fidelity
down many generations, in which case they can
accumulate information by selection on epigenetic var-
iants, as we saw with genes, as mentioned earlier [38].
If some epigenetic system turns out to have been
selected in part because of its ability to transmit phe-
notypes down many generations, then it too will have
the earlier-mentioned meta-function. I call any mech-
anism with that meta-function an inheritance system.
The selected phenotypes that are so-transmitted are
inherited representations (genetic representations are one
kind). Most importantly for our purposes, human
evolution seems to have depended in part on one or
more cultural inheritance systems. In that case, some
of the information on which human phenotypic adap-
tations depend for their development derives neither
from the genome, nor from the individual detecting
correlational information available within its own indi-
vidual experience, but from the developing individual
reacting to information in its culture. Cultural pro-
cesses of selection and transmission account for the
way such cultural variants carry correlational infor-
mation about adaptively-significant facts.
(c) Genetic representation underpins some
connections between i-properties
Genetic representation explains why the properties
associated with the concept of innateness cluster
together in some cases. In organisms with little or no
culture there are two main sources of adaptively-
relevant information. First, there is information that
individuals can detect in their developmental environ-
ment in their lifetime. Second, there is the information
conveyed by genetic representations (and, if they turn
out to be empirically significant, by epigenetic rep-
resentations that are carried along with the genome).
A phenotype that develops in reliance on a genetic rep-
resentation may adaptively match its environment in
respects that the individual has not detected in its
own lifetime. So there is a connection with poverty
of the stimulus arguments. The trait can develop in
the absence of certain kinds of information about the
environmental feature it comes adaptively to match.
For example, the female hummingbird E. jugularis
develops its long curved bill even if deprived during
its development of anything that provides information
about the shape of H. bihai flowers.
That explains a link between genetic representation
and one of the i-properties. There is also likely to be a
certain amount of developmental fixity in a trait that
develops in reliance on a genetic representation.
To have been selected, the trait must have developed
reasonably robustly across the kinds of environmental
variations encountered when it was selected. To the
extent that current environmental variations fall
within that range, it is likely that the trait will arise in
development despite such variations. If under continu-
ing selection pressure, the trait may have even become
developmentally canalized against such variations.
Adaptive polymorphisms have sometimes been
thought to be an exception to this principle. If we
adopt the right grain of analysis, it becomes clear
2238 N. Shea Review. New thinking and innateness
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2012)
 on June 25, 2012rstb.royalsocietypublishing.orgDownloaded from 
that they are not. Evolution has selected for a develop-
mental program that produces different outcomes
in different environments, with some cue detected in
development responsible for the fact that an individual
ends up with the variant that adaptively matches its
particular environment. That developmental disposi-
tion has a causal basis, which must itself develop. So
it is that causal basis, rather than the various poly-
morphic outcomes of development, that is likely to
be developmentally fixed, at least across the range of
environments in which it evolved. The adaptive
match of the eventual mature phenotype to its environ-
ment is partly due to genetic representation and partly
due to adaptive reliance on environmental infor-
mation. We will see later that such mixed models
have particular importance in the human case.
Although a trait that develops in reliance on a genetic
representation is likely to be fixed or canalized against
the kinds of environmental variations present when it
was selected, there is no reason to expect its develop-
ment to be causally independent of the environment.
Gene-based natural selection works on the basis of cor-
relations between some genetic variant and some
phenotypic outcome, correlations that are reasonably
reliable at the time of selection. Those correlations
can be very long range indeed. A genetic variant can
bias the production of one phenotype over another by
all sorts of devious means, and the pathway leading
from zygotic DNA to phenotypic outcome can be intri-
cate and interactive without limit. The informational
contribution of a genetic representation is compatible
with extremely rich causal contributions of the environ-
ment to the development of the trait.
Taking stock: recognizing the role of genetic rep-
resentations in development explains why, in the
absence of cultural inheritance systems, the following
properties should co-occur better than chance: being
a universal or species-typical adaptation, developing
in a way that is invariant across some range of environ-
mental variations, and there being an aspect of the
adaptive information carried by the trait about its
environment that is not the result of learning and
about which a poverty of the stimulus argument
could be made. These connections admit of excep-
tions, for a variety of reasons, but they co-occur
often enough to make inferences between these prop-
erties go right better than by chance. So when a
non-human trait is labelled ‘innate’ and taken to
have these properties, the inferences it underpins will
be reasonably reliable.
3 INHERITED REPRESENTATION
(a) Adaptation through cultural transmission
We cannot be so sanguine about innateness claims in
the domain of human cognition. The rich interactivity
of human behavioural development firmly severs any
connection of gene-based adaptations with genetic
determinism, or with their development being less
causally dependent on the environment. That is the
more familiar point about innateness that human evol-
ution raises in a particularly pressing way. It is the
New Thinking’s conclusion that culturally transmitted
information has been particularly important in recent
human evolution that fatally undermines any utility
of the innateness concept.
Sometimes when individuals get information from
social sources they still learn for themselves. For
example, with stimulus enhancement the individual
learns for itself, through trial and error, how to perform
some useful novel action on or with the stimulus.
Nevertheless, with many of these social sources of
information, a component of the adaptively-relevant
information is being contributed by a cultural process.
It consists of information the individual did not detect
for itself. In some cases, it gives the individual access
to a source of information that they could not detect
for themselves.
Learning by ‘overimitation’ offers a clean example
of this point. Both humans [39] and other primates
[40] are capable of copying the means by which a
demonstrated action is performed. Both can appreci-
ate the difference between means to an intended goal
and irrelevant actions [41–44] (cf. [45]). There is evi-
dence that human children, unlike other apes, have a
tendency to copy all the actions demonstrated in
obtaining some desirable outcome, not just those
that are causally necessary to obtaining the outcome.
Chimpanzees, in contrast, cut out action steps that
seem to them causally unnecessary [41,46].
This contrast is apparent in experiments using two
versions of a mechanical box. In the transparent ver-
sion the mechanism is visible so it is apparent when
some actions performed by the demonstrator are cau-
sally irrelevant to achieving the goal of getting a reward
out of the box. When the action sequence is demon-
strated on an opaque box, it is not apparent that
some of the action steps are unnecessary. Both chim-
panzees and human children copy all the action steps
performed on the opaque box in order to obtain the
reward. With the transparent box, chimpanzees cut
out the unnecessary action steps and go straight for
the reward. Human children, in contrast, have a ten-
dency still to copy all the demonstrated actions, even
those that, by their own lights, are unnecessary to
obtain the outcome. (That the children understand
that some steps are unnecessary can be demonstrated
in other experiments.)
There also seems to be a developmental trajectory.
At the age of 12 and 18 months infants are focused
on outcomes and tend not to copy specific demon-
strated actions [47]. Three-year-olds are capable of
copying specific actions [48] but less inclined to imi-
tate unnecessary steps in the sequence. By the age of
five years, children imitate obviously irrelevant actions
in a wide range of conditions [49–52] (but cf. [53]).
Overimitation appears to be even more pronounced
in adults [54].
The human tendency to overimitate can seem para-
doxical—would it not lead to the spread of useless or
even detrimental behavioural variants?—until we rea-
lize that making individuals’ tendency to imitate less
sensitive to individual learning can increase its fidelity
as an information transmission system [55]. The fide-
lity of cultural transmission can have a large impact on
the power of cultural inheritance mechanisms [56].
If humans have a tendency blindly to imitate the
demonstrated intentional actions even when, by their
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own lights, various of the actions are causally otiose,
then this would allow the transmission of behaviours
the utility of which is not apparent to any individual.
So the tendency to overimitate may itself have
evolved—genetically, or perhaps even culturally [9]—
for the sake of transmitting behavioural phenotypes
in a reasonably high-fidelity way down the generations.
For example, the connection between food prep-
aration practices and nutritional outcomes may be so
stochastic and variable that it is realistically impossible
for a single individual to keep track of which practices
have positive and negative impacts on fitness. But if
lineages of individuals tend to adopt the same practices
as their parents, then more beneficial variants will pro-
liferate on average, because of their positive effects on
the fitness of the individuals who have them. Similarly,
the connection between action and outcomemay be too
long-term for an individual to detect it for themselves
(cf. the link between smoking and cancer, which it
took modern epidemiological statistics to detect).
Thus, given the right evolutionary conditions, the
type of behavioural dispositions found in a population,
which have been transmitted by overimitation, will
carry information about past environments. Those
that were beneficial to fitness in past environments will
be found at higher frequency. To the extent that the cur-
rent environment is relevantly similar to those past
environments, the current pattern of behavioural dispo-
sitions carries adaptively-relevant information about
features of the environment. That information has not
been generated by individual learning, nor by any indi-
vidual being able to detect the adaptively-relevant
feature of the environment for themselves. Rather, it is
selection over evolutionary time that has built up the
information in the population. When a new individual
adopts a behavioural disposition by overimitation from
its parents, it is relying on adaptively-relevant infor-
mation that has been generated by selection. But
unlike genetic representation, the information carried
in the overimitation-based cultural inheritance system
(if there is one) is not present at birth.
That undermines a clean distinction between inher-
ited information that is present at birth and acts as
a constraint on the developmental trajectory (e.g.
genetic representations), and adaptively-relevant infor-
mation that individuals learn for themselves in their
own lifetime. Culturally transmitted information is
acquired by individuals in the course of their own life-
time, but individuals do not learn for themselves that
it is adaptively-relevant; indeed, they may not be able
to do so. On any reasonable view, the richly interactive
process by which these traits develop counts as learning.
So if innateness were simply equated with being
unlearnt, as suggested earlier, these traits would not
count as innate. That would overlook the fact that
they sharemany properties with gene-based adaptations
that are paradigmatically innate. Their development is
likely to be relatively fixed in the face of the range of vari-
ation encountered in the developmental environments
in which they were selected. Indeed, their development
may be have become canalized against environmental
variation by means of other culturally or genetically
inherited processes (gene–culture coevolution in the
second case). And since the adaptively-relevant
information on which they are based was generated by
selection, their development will be susceptible to a pov-
erty of the stimulus argument: the relevant information
about an adaptively significant feature of the environ-
ment may not be detected or detectable in the course
of individual development. Cultural selection gives rise
to traits that would count as non-innate on the ‘learning’
definition, but for which the standard inferences drawn
about non-innate traits will go awry.
Other forms of cultural transmission depend to a
greater extent on individuals being able to learn for
themselves [57]. For example, the most successful
strategies in the social learning strategies tournament
would try out observed behaviours for themselves
and only add the behaviour to their repertoire if they
themselves received a benefit for the behaviour [8].
That was a more efficient strategy than trying out a be-
haviour at random, because behaviours at high
frequency in the social environment were more likely
to be beneficial than a strategy picked at random.
That is to say, the frequency of behavioural variants
in the social environment carries information about
what is adaptively useful. How is that information gen-
erated? In part through individual learning: high
frequency behaviours are those that other individuals
have tried out and found to be rewarding. But part
of the information is generated by selection, because
behavioural dispositions are inherited from parents
and the payoffs obtained by an individual affect the
number of offspring they have.
That mix is characteristic of the usefulness of cultu-
rally transmitted information. Some is information that
others have learnt for themselves, so the imitator is
short-cutting the need to learn something that they
could, if necessary, have learnt from their environment.
Other aspects of culturally transmitted information are
generated in the transmission process itself, as a result
of selection. In the latter sense individuals are doing
more than ‘standing on the shoulders’ of the learning
done by earlier individuals; cultural transmission is
giving rise to adaptively relevant information that is
more than the sum of the individual learning of the
individuals who make up the culture [22].
(b) A central role for culturally transmitted
information
The argument that cultural transmission plays a central
role in generating adaptively-relevant information faces
two obstacles. The first is a tension between individuals
learning for themselves, and cultural transmission
building up information through natural selection. As
noted earlier, the ability of individuals to learn for
themselves and adopt the behaviour that seems best
to them, from their own limited experience, introduces
noise into the system for cultural transmission of be-
havioural phenotypes. As Godfrey-Smith argues [22],
the more transmission depends on the intelligence of
the individuals, the less ‘Darwinian’ the process will
be. It will be less well-characterized by the models of
quantitative genetics, for example.
However, Godfrey-Smith argues that this at most
undermines the applicability of Darwinian micro-
evolutionary models to the process. At the macro
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level, phylogenies of cultural practices can be highly
illuminating even if the transmission process is nothing
like high-fidelity individual-to-individual copying [58].
Also, at an intermediate level that Godfrey-Smith calls
‘meso-evolution’, a Darwinian approach can explain
the origin of complex adaptive traits, even with intelli-
gent transmission, since it explains the spread of
adaptively beneficial phenotypes, whose high frequency
in turn increases the chances of the next cumulative
step of adaptive progress being discovered by an indi-
vidual in the population. In short, the mix of
individual learning and information produced by selec-
tion, identified above, is compatible with a broadly
Darwinian approach to understanding how individuals
manage to produce phenotypes that adaptively match
their environment.
The second problem concerns the sharing of infor-
mation. Developing individuals’ use of culturally
transmitted adaptively-relevant information found
within their society is a form of information sharing.
How can such information sharing practices be evolu-
tionarily stable in the face of the fitness advantage that
could be garnered by an individual in defecting—
keeping a piece of useful information to themselves
[2]? Natural selection runs off fitness differences; so
if keeping information to oneself has costs, both to
oneself and others, then the selfish strategy will be
selected if the costs to others are higher than to one-
self. For example, there are obvious advantages to
sharing information about good hygiene. If others
adopt a hygienic practice that I have discovered, that
will on average reduce the overall risk of disease in
the population, and so will indirectly reduce my own
disease risk. But suppose I can get some benefit to
myself from the hygienic practice, and suppose also
that it is practical to keep it to myself. Then, although I
would do better in absolute fitness if I were to share the
practice, I will do better in relative fitness if I keep it to
myself. I gain a relative fitness advantage since the risk
of disease, although higher for all, falls more on others
than it does on me. Why then share useful information?
Part of the answer may lie in the inherent difficulty
of keeping some of these forms of information secret.
Behaviours are observable, and a behavioural pattern
that must be performed repeatedly is likely to be
observed by those in the same social group. A restric-
tion to vertical transmission of behavioural phenotypes
would also help. If parents are only inclined to demon-
strate useful behaviours to offspring and close kin,
then they derive a direct fitness benefit from sharing
useful information. Interestingly, there is evidence
that overimitation is more common in ‘natural pedago-
gical’ contexts [59,60]. So far natural pedagogy has
mostly been studied as a modifier of when children
are disposed to learn. If it also restricts when adults
are inclined to teach, then it could, in the evolutionary
past, have constituted a system whereby lineages of be-
havioural phenotypes transmitted by overimitation
roughly aligned with parent–offspring lineages, and
hence with biological fitness.
A restriction to roughly vertical transmission will
not cover anything like all of the cases. A more impor-
tant part of the answer may lie in group selection (in
the specific sense that between-group relative fitness
benefits outweigh within-group relative fitness costs).
If there is strong group selection then the fitness
advantage of being in a group that shares information,
vis-a`-vis individuals in less informationally open social
groups, may outweigh the relative fitness benefits to be
garnered by selfishly keeping useful information to
oneself. Although there is widespread scepticism
about the importance of group selection in other
species, it may well have been a particularly powerful
influence in recent hominin evolution [61,62]. There
is archaeological, palaeontological and anthropological
evidence that humans lived in tight-knit social groups,
perhaps extended kin groups in the first instance, with
important variations between groups in culture, behav-
ioural practices and even way of life. Powerful group
selection would make a tendency to transmit adap-
tively relevant information throughout the social
group less puzzling.
In sum, the following factors have probably played
a role in recent human evolution: (i) high-fidelity
transmission processes that closely model genetic
micro-evolution; (ii) more diffuse ways that cultural
transmission can build up adaptively-relevant informa-
tion through selection; and (iii) cultural transmission
as a means for disseminating and preserving useful
information that individuals have learnt for them-
selves, allowing subsequent individual learning to
‘stand on their shoulders’. The relative importance of
these factors remains an open empirical question.
(c) No clustering of i-properties for human
psychological phenotypes
These considerations mean that human development
is likely to be particularly reliant on an interesting cate-
gory of adaptively-significant information: information
whose utility individuals are not wholly responsible for
detecting for themselves, but information which,
unlike more familiar forms of inherited representation
(genetic, epigenetic), is picked up by the individual
during her own lifetime. That decisively severs any con-
nection between natural selection being responsible for
the adaptive match between phenotype and environ-
ment, and the adaptively-relevant information being
present at birth (in the zygote) and unlearnt. When
the developing individual absorbs a culturally trans-
mitted practice, or is steered by some culturally
transmitted factor towards an adaptive phenotype,
those are clearly cases of getting information from the
environment. The information carried by these kinds
of inherited representations is not information about
which a poverty of the stimulus argument would suc-
ceed. It comes from (social) stimuli. The rough
clustering of the i-properties in other species was
underpinned by the fact that, if an individual did not
learn the adaptively-relevant information for them-
selves, the information embodied in the adaptive
match between a developmental outcome and the
environment is very likely to have been generated by
natural selection on genes, and to have been trans-
mitted to this individual genetically, in factors that
are present in the zygote and act so as to bias the com-
plex interactive pathways of development towards the
adaptive phenotype. Even that rough clustering will
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break down if the New Thinking is right about the
importance of cultural transmission.
What about the universality or species-typicality of
adaptive traits, that is presupposed by the concept of
innateness? Recall that, when faced with adaptive poly-
morphisms in other species, I argued that there is
plausibly a shared developmental program, designed
to be guided by environmental information so as to
produce different outcomes in different environments,
each more adaptive in the environment in which it is
produced. That does not carry over to the human
case either. Or at least if it does, it is only in
the most tenuous way. The New Thinking suggests
that the ‘developmental program’ underpinning a
huge swathe of polymorphic adaptive phenotypes is
humans’ highly adapted capacity for plasticity itself.
That is a very domain-general ability. Of course, it
too carries adaptively-relevant information—that the
environment is likely to be very variable, that these
are good ways to engage in learning—but what is
absent is a more specific developmental program
designed by evolution for a particular problem or set
of problems. In short, extreme plasticity in some
cases drives the nature of the potentially universal
adaptation to the very highest, most general level.
In other cases cultural inheritance may form the
basis of universal, developmentally robust or even
environmentally canalized human phenotypes.
In sum, an implication of the direction taken by the
NewThinking in this collection is that the generalization
that makes the i-properties cluster together roughly for
non-human adaptations, giving the concept of innate-
ness some utility there, is absent in the case of recent
human behavioural adaptations. There is no particular
reason to expect those human behavioural phenotypes
that are plausibly adaptations to have the following fea-
tures: to be due to natural selection on genes; to be
unlearnt, or to develop such that aspects of the adap-
tively-relevant information on which they depend are
not found in the developmental environment (such
that a poverty of the stimulus argument could be
made); to have a developmental course that is particu-
larly invariant or canalized against environmental
variations; or to be based on a universal developmental
program, save the most domain-general capacities for
plasticity, learning and cultural inheritance itself.
4. THE NEW THINKING ARTICULATED IN TERMS
OF INHERITED REPRESENTATION
This paper has argued that recognizing the semantic
information carried by genetic transmission down the
generations—genetic representation—allows us to see
why properties connected to the concept of innateness
do tend to cluster together when applied to many bio-
logical adaptations. The utility of the innateness
concept in those contexts makes it tempting to
import it into our account of human evolution. High
church Evolutionary Psychology does indeed claim
that human psychological capacities are innate in a
closely parallel sense: a suite of domain-specific adap-
tations produced by natural selection on genes, that
are unlearnt, developmentally fixed and cross-cultu-
rally universal. The New Thinking points to evidence
that argues against those claims. But the difference
between the two viewpoints cannot be usefully encap-
sulated using the concept of innateness. The concept
of inherited representation furnishes a clearer distinc-
tion. Evolutionary Psychology holds that genetic
representation is by far the most important type of
inherited representation responsible for human cogni-
tive phenotypes. The New Thinking instead sees
culturally transmitted inherited representations as an
important source of the adaptively-relevant infor-
mation present in human psychological phenotypes.
The characteristics that the New Thinking identifies
as distinctive of human cognitive evolution also put
pressure on the coherence of the concept of innateness,
as it is applied to human psychology. The problem is not
just that some of the inferences about innate traits that
would go through in other biological domains fail in
the case of human psychology. It is that there is no
good proposal for a theoretical reconstruction of the
concept of innateness that would explain why any sig-
nificant portion of the inferences about human
psychological traits standardly made using the concept
of innateness should be reliable. If that is correct, then
one important mistake of Evolutionary Psychology,
which the New Thinking has transcended, is to make
use of the concept of innateness. In contrast the New
Thinking manages to be deeply evolutionary, while not
being dependent on the concept of innateness at all.
That might be thought to leave a lacuna. How can
the New Thinking account for the kinds of phenomena
that innateness claims have been thought to explain?
In this paper I have focused on one explanandum in
particular: the adaptive match between phenotype
and environment achieved as the end result of develop-
ment. When that match is not wholly explained by the
individual accessing adaptively-relevant information in
its own experience, having detected its adaptive rel-
evance itself, we are left with a puzzle: where did the
information come from?
Inherited representation provides an answer, point-
ing to the multiple routes by which information
generated by natural selection can constrain individual
development towards an adaptive phenotypic out-
come, so that aspects of the adaptively-relevant
information carried by the phenotype need not
derive from individual experience. Genetic and epige-
netic mechanisms can play that role, giving rise to
adaptively-relevant information that is present at
birth; but we also saw three cultural routes to adaptive
phenotypes, in none of which is the adaptively-relevant
information present at birth, but which involve learn-
ing (albeit that individuals do not detect the adaptive
significance of all the information for themselves).
Although cultural processes, learning and interactive
development are central, the New Thinking is also
thoroughly evolutionary, relying strongly on natural
selection in explaining human psychology, unlike
blank slate empiricism and the standard social science
model. Phylogenetic methods and cross-species
comparisons are relied on heavily, as part of the careful
accumulation and assessment of all available evidence
about the hominin and primate past. The importance
that the New Thinking attaches to historical evidence
shows just how serious it is about evolutionary
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explanation. However, using the concept of innateness
to theorize about human evolution sits ill with the New
Thinking. This paper argues that the supposed explana-
tory benefits of innateness claims can be salvaged,
without residue, by identifying the significance for
human evolution of various forms of inherited
representation: genetic, epigenetic and cultural.
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larger, like a chromosome or, in asexually reproducing species, the
entire genome, even if the difference between the genomes on
which selection is acting can be found at a single genetic locus.
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